World Section at Muncie Free Press - Delaware County Indiana

Which way to PhuCat

volunteer47305 — Mon, 14 Apr 2008 03:07:39 +0000

Yes I can afford to smile; but it is only because I know I am getting another day shorter

LZ English North

volunteer47305 — Mon, 14 Apr 2008 02:34:39 +0000

Randall Jacobsen in Vietnam March 1969 to March 1970 attached to the 173rd Air Born Bde.

volunteer47305 — Mon, 14 Apr 2008 02:26:37 +0000

Just a few old memories

Randall Jacobsen has seen some of the world

volunteer47305 — Mon, 14 Apr 2008 02:04:51 +0000

In my travels around the world, I have encountered a few Quonset Huts and lived in a few too. So I decided to "Adopt them for our shop"

Images by Randall Jacobsen Sr.

volunteer47305 — Mon, 14 Apr 2008 01:53:13 +0000

This is the Army Navy Surplus of Muncie, as seen from the parking lot looking south toward E. Jackson St. in the winter of 2007-08

Gates Stops in Belgium En Route to NATO Summit

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 31 Mar 2008 17:16:17 +0000

By Fred W. Baker III
American Forces Press Service

MONS, BELGIUM – Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates stopped here briefly today for a fact-finding visit on his way to the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania.

Gates will spend only a few hours at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, receiving operational updates on NATO efforts in Afghanistan and Kosovo from Army Gen. Bantz J. Craddock, the alliance's top commander.

"The secretary's looking to get a feel for the situation on the ground … and how it's looked at from the headquarters perspective," a senior defense official, speaking on background, told reporters traveling with Gates during the flight from Andrews Air Force Base, Md., to Brussels, where the secretary's aircraft landed before his party boarded helicopters for the trip to SHAPE.

"He thought it would make sense to go to SHAPE before going to Bucharest to get a better sense how SHAPE plays in the whole decision-making process, … and in particular, he wants to get some operational briefs on Afghanistan and on Kosovo," the official said.

This is Gates' 11th trip to Europe, but his first visit to SHAPE as defense secretary. Gates also will stop in Copenhagen, Denmark, for meetings with his Danish counterpart before going on to the summit.

Source: US Department of Defense

Soldiers, Airmen Save Iraqi Teen Injured by Bomb

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 31 Mar 2008 17:08:52 +0000

By Staff Sgt. Margaret C. Nelson, USA
Special to American Forces Press Service

KIRKUK, IRAQ - On his way home from working in his family's field near this Iraqi city, Rahmey didn't see the hidden improvised explosive device until it was too late.

Staggering for home after the blast, the 13-year-old Iraqi boy had no way to know that his life would be saved by the quick, selfless actions of U.S. Army soldiers and U.S. Air Force airmen March 27.

"I heard and saw the explosion from my window," said Arif Muter Jarew, Rahmey's father.

Soldiers and U.S. soldiers load an Iraqi teenager injured by an improvised explosive device onto a medical evacuation helicopter near Kirkuk, Iraq, March 27, 2008. The soldiers are assigned to the 10th Mountain Division's Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st Aviation Brigade.
(Click photo for screen-resolution image);high-resolution image available.

It wasn't long before his son stumbled in with shrapnel wounds riddling his knee, leg and chest.

"I was panicked, there was blood coming from his mouth," Jarew said. "My son was dying. He had blood everywhere."

The hospital was miles away and the desperate father didn't think his vehicle would make it. With his son in his arms, he ran out to the street to flag down passing motorists for help.

"Then I saw a convoy of American soldiers," he said. Jarew was a little wary of asking for help from coalition forces. With his dying son in his arms, he only hesitated a moment – his son's life was at stake.

"We saw some Iraqis waving us to stop and one was cradling a kid," said Pfc. Jeffrey Parson of the 10th Mountain Division's 1st Brigade.

Parson and Pvt. Justin Avila, the patrol's medic, began treating what they initially thought were gunshot wounds.

"There was blood coming from the kid's mouth and his wounds, so we treated the
bleeding first," Parson said.

The patrol radioed Forward Operating Base McHenry in the Hawijah district of Tamim province. A medical evacuation helicopter arrived a few precious minutes after receiving the call to transport Rahmey and his father to the FOB. After medics stabilized Rahmey's condition, he was transported along with his father to the medical facility in Kirkuk, Iraq.

U.S. Army and Air Force medics treated Rahmey for shrapnel wounds at the Freedom Hospital.

"He's a very lucky boy," said Air Force Capt. Gabriel Rulewicz, a military surgeon. "He'll need some surgery to remove the shrapnel, but we've stabilized him for transport to a hospital in Kirkuk."

The Air Force surgeon credits Rahmey's survival to the quick reaction by everyone involved. "It is a perfect ending to what could have quickly resulted in the opposite," he said.

But to one Iraqi father, this ending was more than perfect.

"I did not know how caring U.S. soldiers are. I could not believe how well they treated my son and me," Jarew said. "I am so thankful to everyone who saved my son's life."

Source: US Department of Defense (Army Staff Sgt. Margaret C. Nelson is assigned to the 115th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment.)

Gates Looks to Strengthen Ties with India

kpaul.mallasch — Wed, 27 Feb 2008 03:10:17 +0000

By Fred W. Baker III
American Forces Press Service

NEW DELHI, Feb. 26, 2008 – Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates landed here today looking to expand on what one official said already is one of the best military-to-military relationships the United States has with any country in the world.

This is Gates' first visit here and one in which he hopes to strengthen the bilateral defense and security relationships that have increased to historic proportions in recent years between the world's two largest democracies.

"We already have a very ambitious schedule of exchanges and exercises that is growing in size and sophistication. Clearly the defense trade relationship is growing. So I think that there are a numbers of areas where there is potential for cooperation," the secretary said at a brief news conference before his day of meetings began.

Over the course of the day, Gates is meeting with the country's ministers of defense and external affairs, its prime minister and members of its parliament.

With India's full military modernization program under way and billions of dollars at stake, defense trade is key among the secretary's talking points in his meetings here, a senior DoD official told reporters on background. India last year issued a request for proposals from potential manufacturers for 126 multi-role combat aircraft for its air force. The deal, estimated at about $10 billion, would be the world's largest single external defense procurement in history, DoD officials believe. Last month, India sent out another request for proposals for 312 helicopters for its air force and army. That deal is expected to be worth about $1 billion.

Also in January, India closed a $1 billion deal with Lockheed Martin for six C-130J Hercules aircraft for its special forces. This deal was a first for the United States and India. Since 1999, India's military purchases reportedly have been worth $25 billion, and the country is likely to spend another $30 billion by 2012.

"We have tried for some years now to get a seat at the table, and we're finally there," the Defense Department official said, adding that Gates will tell officials here that U.S. defense trade offers the "full package."

"When you go into joint production (and) cooperative development (with the United States), you're getting not only the best product in the world, but you have the best support system, the best maintenance package over the life of the product," the official said. "You also have companies that operate with integrity, which is different than what India has seen with other partners in the world. We're very transparent."

Some of the details to be talked through are the two countries' bureaucratic buying and selling processes, the official said.

Another senior official was quick to point out that the meetings are not all about defense procurement.

"We're just getting into the defense trade business, (but) we have more well-rounded defense relationships with India than any other country," the official said.

Gates will discuss the future of military-to-military relationships between the United States and India. The two countries already participate annually in one of the world's largest naval exercises, which involves the navies of five countries and 30 vessels. India had two aircraft carriers in the exercise, and the U.S. Navy had one. Singapore, Australia and Japan also participated.

India's navy is by far the most capable navy in the region. The country relies on the sea for 90 percent of its oil and natural gas and more than 90 percent of its foreign trade. It has one aircraft carrier, two others on order, 14 submarines and 15 major surface combatants, according to U.S. State Department records. It is capable of projecting power within the Indian Ocean basin and occasionally operates in the South China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf.

The Indian army numbers more than 1.1 million, according to U.S. State Department records. The Army has been heavily committed in the recent past to counterterrorism operations as well as providing aid to civil authorities and assisting in relief operations. Its current modernization program focuses on equipment for combating terror.

The country's air force also is modernizing its force with new tactics and the acquisition of modern aircraft.

The United States is India's largest trading partner. Bilateral trade in 2006 was $32 billion, according to the U.S. State Department.

Source: US Department of Defense

Raul Castro Picked as Cuba's President

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 25 Feb 2008 10:06:35 +0000

By Brian Wagner

MIAMI, FL - Cuba's National Assembly confirmed the transfer of power to Raul Castro, from his brother, Fidel. Officials announced the decision at a meeting Sunday, February 24, 2008, to select the 31 members of the governing Council of State, which includes the presidency.

Raul told delegates in the 614-member assembly that he will continue his brother's work to lead the Communist nation.

Raul said he accepted the responsibility placed upon him, adding that Fidel can never be replaced.

The 76-year-old Raul had been serving as acting president since July 2006, when his brother temporarily handed over power to undergo intestinal surgery. Last week, Cuban state media published a letter from Fidel Castro, saying he would not stand for re-election as president because he remains frail following the operation.

At the start of Sunday's assembly meeting, delegates applauded when Fidel's name was called, but state television showed his chair was empty. The 81-year-old has not been seen in public since his operation.

Since taking over temporary power, Raul Castro has called for a national debate to find ways to strengthen the Communist state, improve economic activity and correct income inequality.

In a statement early Sunday, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called on the Cuban government to begin a process of peaceful and democratic change, including the release of political prisoners. She said the Cuban people have a right to hold democratic elections and to engage in a dialogue about the island's future after what she called "five decades of tyranny."

Source: Voice of America

Statement on Cuba’s Transition

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 25 Feb 2008 10:02:26 +0000

Washington, DC - The following is a statement by Secretary Condoleezza Rice released through the Office of the Spokesman on Sunday, February 24, 2008.

At this significant moment in Cuba’s history, we reaffirm our belief that the Cuban people have an inalienable right to participate in an open and comprehensive dialogue about their country’s future, free of fear and repression, and to choose their leaders in democratic elections. We support their aspirations for a better life, and their desire to enjoy the fundamental rights and liberties expressed in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. We support their efforts to obtain a voice in their national destiny, and their desire to gain access to the resources and opportunities necessary to become masters of their own lives, enhance the well-being of their families, and achieve their God-given potential.

We urge the Cuban government to begin a process of peaceful, democratic change by releasing all political prisoners, respecting human rights, and creating a clear pathway towards free and fair elections. We also urge the international community to work with the Cuban people to begin to build institutions necessary for democracy, and to support Cuban civil society. The Cuban people, facing the legacy of five decades of tyranny, merit our solidarity and support as they seek to construct a brighter future.

2008/136

Source: US Department of State

Troops in Iraq Kill Four, Capture Dozens, Seize Weapons

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 25 Feb 2008 09:58:33 +0000

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, DC - Coalition and Iraqi forces killed four suspected terrorists, detained 56 others and destroyed weapons in Iraq over the past three days, military officials said Sunday, February 24, 2008.

During operations in Iraq February 23:

-- Coalition forces nabbed nine suspected terrorists during operations in Tikrit and east of Hamim al Alil targeting suspects involved in foreign-terrorist smuggling for the al Qadea in Iraq network in Mosul.

-- Troops detained four wanted suspects in an area in Mosul believed to be a safe haven for foreign terrorists involved in recent attacks on Iraqi and coalition forces. The location also reportedly is connected to a suspect detained Feb. 19 for his association with a senior-level terrorist smuggler in the city, military officials said.

-- Coalition troops captured an alleged al Qaeda in Iraq member involved in planning suicide attacks in Baghdad. The suspect reportedly had arranged to receive a suicide vest in order to attack a group of concerned-local-citizen recruits. Ground forces detained an additional terrorist suspect in the operation.

-- Troops nabbed one suspected terrorist east of Khan Bani Sad at an alleged al Qaeda in Iraq meeting location associated with the suicide network in the Diyala River Valley. Nearby, coalition forces directed a fixed-wing airstrike on a house assessed to be rigged with explosives, military officials said.

-- Coalition forces south of Samarra captured an alleged associate of an al Qaeda in Iraq network operating in Anbar province. Reports indicate the suspect is connected to a terrorist leader associated with links to senior terrorists operating both inside and outside Iraq and who is involved in al Qaeda media and propaganda operations.

In operations around Iraq February 23:

-- Coalition troops killed a suspected terrorist east of Samarra in Karwi who was later identified as an al Qaeda in Iraq associate of the Baqouba suicide-bombing network, military officials said. Coalition aircraft killed two additional suspected terrorists, and ground forces detained seven others and seized bomb-making materials in the operation.

-- Troops killed a wanted terrorist and captured another during an afternoon raid in Baghdad. Both wanted individuals were reportedly close associates of the senior al Qaeda in Iraq leader of networks operating in the Iraqi capital, military officials said. In a separate raid in Baghdad, coalition forces detained two alleged car-bomb-network operatives.

-- Coalition forces seized five suspected terrorists in Mosul during an operation targeting an associate of a senior-level foreign-terrorist smuggler and al Qaeda in Iraq leader in the region, military officials said.

-- Troops northwest of Tarmiyah nabbed a wanted individual believed to be involved in the Karkh al Qaeda in Iraq network and detained two additional suspects. Reports indicate the prime target had been inactive for several months but recently resumed a role in rebuilding the network following a series of recent coalition operations that degraded the cell.

-- Coalition forces detained two suspects in Tikrit, including an alleged al Qaeda in Iraq associate involved in weapons smuggling. The suspect allegedly transferred weapons recently from Beiji to Tikrit. Reports also indicate the suspect is connected to foreign terrorist safe houses and a large weapons cache found in a previous operation in the area.

-- Coalition troops detained four suspected terrorists northeast of Samarra near the Hamrin mountains during a multiday operation that took place yesterday and Feb. 22.

In other Feb. 22 Iraq operations:

-- Troops west of Samarra captured an alleged al Qaeda in Iraq cell leader involved in the Jazirah network. The suspect allegedly commands a group of 10 to 15 terrorists who conduct attacks in the area. Ground forces detained six others in the operation.

-- Troops in Mosul captured an alleged associate of foreign al Qaeda in Iraq leaders believed to be responsible for recent attacks against coalition and Iraqi security forces in the area. Ground forces nabbed two additional suspects in the raid and discovered a weapons cache containing 20 mortar rounds, military officials said.

-- Coalition forces detained three suspected terrorists on the west side of Mosul, including an alleged associate of numerous foreign al Qaeda in Iraq leaders in Samarra. Reports indicate the suspect moved to Mosul from Samarra after coalition and Iraqi forces operations disrupted Samarra's al Qaeda in Iraq leadership, military officials said.

-- Coalition forces captured a suspected Iranian-trained "special groups" militia operative and detained one other suspect during operations to disrupt criminal networks in Baghdad. As an intelligence operative, the targeted individual reportedly aided special groups attacks on Iraqi and coalition forces, military officials said.

Source: US Department of Defense - (Compiled from Multinational Force Iraq and Multinational Corps Iraq new releases.)

Coalition Troops in Afghanistan Detain Four Insurgents

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 14:09:45 +0000

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, DC – Four suspected insurgents were detained over the weekend by coalition troops in Afghanistan during an operation to disrupt Taliban leadership networks in Zabul province, military officials said.

Coalition forces performed a search of compounds in Qalat district targeting a Taliban leader linked to anti-government operations in the area. While conducting their search, coalition forces found and detained four individuals with suspected links to insurgent networks, including one identified as a mid-level Taliban leader. The detained individuals will be questioned on their involvement in Taliban operations as well as other illegal activities.

"Coalition forces are systematically depleting the Taliban's cadre of experienced leaders to the benefit of the Afghan people and the positive progress of Afghanistan," said Army Maj. Chris Belcher, a coalition forces spokesman.

In other news, Afghan citizens have supplied information leading to the recovery of several weapons caches during the past week in Nangarhar province's Kot and Khogyani sectors.

The largest cache was discovered Feb. 14 near Shamakalay Village, Khogyani district. This cache included a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, eight rocket-propelled grenade rounds, five rocket-propelled grenade boosters, two hand grenades, a mortar fuse and a stockpile of 25 mm ammunition.

Another weapons cache was found Feb. 12 in Kailoaghu, Khogyani district. This cache consisted of two anti-personnel mines, a hand grenade, and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher in good condition.

Afghan security forces, assisted by coalition forces, found a suspected insurgent weapons cache near Laghurji Village, Kot district, Feb. 8. That cache contained 10 anti-tank mines, three 60 mm mortar rounds and two 82 mm mortar rounds.

Source: US Department of Defense - (Compiled from Combined Joint Task Force 82 news releases.)

Suicide Bomber Kills 80 in Afghanistan

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 13:53:08 +0000

By Barry Newhouse
Voice of America

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN - Witnesses said the blast over the weekend tore through a crowd of mostly men and boys who were watching a dog fighting festival.

Interior Ministry Spokesman Zamary Bashary called the blast a "very bad" suicide attack.

"The police are investigating the case," said Bashary. "Right now we are sure it was a suicide bomber. Some parts of the legs are remaining on the spot."

Speaking to VOA, he condemned what he called the "criminals" behind the attack and said it shows the perpetrators are opposed to the Afghan people.

Dog fighting competitions are popular in parts of Afghanistan, but were officially banned under the Taliban.

Witnesses at Sunday's blast reported a few police officers and militia leaders opposed to the Taliban were among those killed.

The Taliban, which has waged a tenacious insurgency in southern Afghanistan in the past two years, has not claimed responsibility for the attack. The group frequently takes credit for attacks on government and military targets, but rarely celebrates bombings that cause heavy civilian casualties.

2007 was the deadliest year in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. In November, a bomb attack targeting a group of Afghan parliament members killed more than 40 people.

Source: Voice of America

Kosovo Declares Independence

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 13:30:54 +0000

By Sabina Castelfranco
Voice of America

ROME, ITALY - People danced in the streets of Pristina, fired guns into the air and waved red and black Albanian flags in jubilation at the birth of the world's newest country: Kosovo. The chamber burst into applause after a unanimous vote approved the document proclaiming independence and parliament speaker Jakup Krasniqi declared Kosovo an independent, democratic and sovereign state.

The document was signed by Krasniqi, Prime Minister Hashim Thaci and President Fatmir Sejdiu.

Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci declared: "The day has come and from today onwards, Kosovo is proud, independent and free."

Mr. Thaci added: "There is no room for intimidation, discrimination or unequal treatment of anyone. Our state institutions and our society will stamp out discriminatory practices. In Kosovo there will be tolerance, mutual understanding, solidarity and progress."

But Serbian President Boris Tadic immediately denounced the declaration as unilateral and illegal. Russia also rejected it and and called for an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council.

Tadic has said Serbia would do everything in its power to revoke Kosvo's declaration of independence, but added that Serbia would not use force to reclaim the breakaway province. He urged urged Serbia's political parties and the 130,000 Serbs living in Kosovo "to remain calm."

Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica said on Sunday, February 17, the fake country of Kosoco was illegally declared, on part of the territory, which is under NATO military control. He called it an unprecedented illegal act.

Some violence was reported after Kosovo declared its independence, but there was no significant damage. Hand grenades were thrown at buildings of the European Union and United Nations in the Kosovo-Serb stronghold city of Mitrovica. And Angry Serbs also stoned the U.S. embassy in Belgrade

The U.S., Britain, France and Germany are expected to quickly recognize Kosovo's independence. The European Union foreign policy chief said that stability in Kosovo and the whole Balkan region is essential, and urged everyone to act calmly and responsibly.

Source: Voice of America

Polls Close in Pakistan's Parliamentary Elections

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 13:24:35 +0000

By Meredith Buel

ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN - Officials in Pakistan say more than 80 million voters are eligible to participate in the election to select members of the lower house of Parliament and the nation's four provincial assemblies.

The elections are considered critically important to restoring democracy following eight years of military rule under President Pervez Musharraf.

The voting is occurring against a backdrop of concern about security following the assassination of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto in a gun and suicide bombing attack last December.

More than 80,000 soldiers and nearly 400,000 police and paramilitary forces are providing security for the polls.

The Pakistan Muslim League-Q, which backs President Musharraf, is facing a major challenge from Ms. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party and a faction of the Pakistan Muslim League headed by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

Several deaths were reported during sporadic clashes across the country.

Late Sunday in Lahore unidentified gunmen shot and killed a candidate from Mr. Sharif's party who was running in the provincial elections.

Several American lawmakers are here to observe the elections, including Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, the co-chair of the Pakistan caucus in the House of Representatives.

"We are here today to encourage the Pakistani people to accept the call of courage and to vote," she said. "But we also recognize that it is necessary to provide safe and transparent methods of voting and an atmosphere for voting."

Mr. Musharraf's presidency is not being contested in this election, but if opposition parties win a two-thirds majority in parliament, they would have enough votes to impeach him.

Opposition parties are accusing supporters of Mr. Musharraf of trying to rig the elections.

Ahmed Bilal Mehboob, the director of the independent Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, says he agrees with the allegations.

"Whether he will be able to do the Election Day rigging or not remains to be seen," he said. "But the signs are that the government is positioning itself to manipulate the elections."

President Musharraf has repeatedly promised the elections will be free and fair.

With Pakistan facing a growing insurgency by Taliban and al-Qaida-linked militants, the vote is expected to be a referendum on General Musharraf.

Retired Major General Jamshed Ayaz Khan, the president of the independent Institute for Regional Studies, says he believes it will take several months for the political situation in Pakistan to stabilize.

"Unity does not mean there is no opposition. But it will be a peaceful transfer of power. Then gradually, it will take I think a couple of months, two or three months, gradually moving in that direction where we will have a really good system of parliament," said Khan. "I think it has to be done. It will be done."

Analysts say security concerns are likely to have an impact on turnout, which was about 40-percent in the last national elections in 2002.

Early results are expected by late Monday evening, but final official figures may not be available for several days.

Source: Voice of America

U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability and the Future of U.S. Policy

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 13:12:30 +0000

The following is prepared testimony by Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.

Subject: U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Assassination, Instability and the Future of U.S. Policy

January 16, 2008

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for your invitation to testify on the emerging problems facing the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and their consequences for the United States. As requested by the chairman in his letter of invitation, I will focus my remarks on four issues: (i) the prospect for a free and fair election in Pakistan and the consequences of its absence for stability; (ii) the willingness of the new government to vigorously pursue counterterrorism operations; (iii) the wisdom of reorienting U.S. assistance to Pakistan; and, (iv) the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the context of the current crisis. I respectfully request that my statement be entered into the record.

(I) Free and Fair Elections in Pakistan

The tragic assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, capped a year of great institutional turmoil in Pakistani politics. It also complicated President Musharraf's hopes for an undisturbed validation of his own reelection as president. And, it undermined the administration's efforts to broker a marriage of convenience between Musharraf and Bhutto that would produce a governing dispensation that is civilian in appearance; accept Musharraf's continuance in office because of his importance to U.S. interests; and strengthen the elements of moderation in Pakistan. Bhutto's violent death instantaneously frustrated these three goals and inaugurated an interregnum of uncertainty.

The critical question now for Pakistan and for the United States as well is whether the forthcoming elections to the National Assembly in Pakistan scheduled for February 18, 2008, will be free and fair. This is an issue of some importance because, after eight years of military rule, the political "market" in Pakistan has been sufficiently distorted to the point where it is simply not evident what the authentic preferences of the nation actually are. If nothing else, therefore, a free and fair election in Pakistan is finally necessary so that both Pakistanis and the outside world can assess the yearnings of the electorate in regard to a variety of issues ranging from the desirable form of governance to the commitment of the Pakistani people to combating extremism.

The quality of the forthcoming elections is also important for another critical reason—determining President Musharraf's future—and it is this quandary that has the greatest bearing on whether the February 2008 polls will in fact be a genuine exercise of participatory democracy. Understanding the conundrum here is critical to assessing whether the forthcoming elections can be free and fair as demanded by the administration, the Congress of the United States and the international community.

President Musharraf secured his reelection as president for another five years on October 6, 2007, through the consent of the outgoing National Assembly. This body happened to be dominated by his supporters, which included the alliance of Islamist parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), as a result of the flawed political process leading up to the elections of October 2002. Musharraf has promised, however, that this reelection would be submitted for validation by the incoming National Assembly, which means that, at the very least, he needs an outcome in the February elections that would not cause him to renege on that commitment. Further, Musharraf cannot afford to find himself in a situation where the new National Assembly begins to reconsider or emend the constitutional distortions that he has ordained during his past tenure in office, particularly insofar as these affect the prospect of his continued rule. And, finally, he cannot countenance any elected government that would attempt to remedy his dismissal of the former Chief Justice, Iftikhar Chaudhry, and his associates or resuscitate an independent Supreme Court either through direct legislative action or through the protection of writ petitions aimed expressly at securing this end.

Musharraf's survival as president for an extended term, accordingly, depends on securing a favorable outcome in the National Assembly, where parties that benefit from his unchallenged continuance in office win the election decisively enough to prevent any future challenges to his rule emanating from the legislature. In practice, this means that Musharraf's first preference would be that the Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q) dominate the new government because it is led by individuals who detest his most fervent political antagonist—Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N)—perhaps only slightly less than he does. Given the PML-Q's rather narrow electoral base, however, it is unlikely that the party would secure an absolute majority without large-scale rigging that would discredit the election entirely. Musharraf's next most favorable outcome, therefore, would be a coalition of friendly parties, similar to the kind of arrangement seen in the outgoing National Assembly. In this context, it is possible to imagine a post-electoral outcome that involves Musharraf striking a bargain with Asif Zardari and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), whereby the latter—if it does well at the polls—is enticed to join (or lead) a coalition that is permitted a certain latitude in governance so long as it does not direct or support any fundamental challenge to Musharraf's continuation in office.

The worst outcome from Musharraf's perspective would be a strong electoral performance by Nawaz Sharif's PML-N: the bitterness between these two leaders would inevitably produce a political collision that would undermine the president's interests and possibly threaten his hope for an unchallenged tenure. Somewhat less challenging would be a coalition between principally Sharif's PML-N and Zardari's PPP: although Sharif has certainly made overtures towards to the PPP suggesting such an arrangement, in part to benefit from the sympathy vote that many expect will aid the latter in the forthcoming polls, it is not clear today whether such a coalition is viable and who its other constituents might be. Musharraf's relations with Sharif at any rate are so poisonous that he is likely to respond to the threat of any PML-N presence in the government by attempting to isolate the party politically.

This discussion about electoral outcomes is pertinent only because it highlights a central point about the forthcoming election: President Musharraf needs to be assured of a favorable electoral outcome a priori, if he is to avoid a raft of political challenges to his desire to stay in office. Or else he will be forced to engineer an outcome after the election results are tallied in order to produce a ruling coalition that will not defy his continued presence as president. It is most likely that he will settle for the latter course only if his efforts prior to the election do not succeed in producing a victory for his preferred partners who are both comfortable with his continuation in office and undisturbed by any of the past mutilations inflicted on the country's constitution and its mode of governance.

Given these realities, it is unlikely that the forthcoming elections in Pakistan will be truly "free and fair," that is, remain an adequately neutral process which permits the electorate to convey its political preferences effectively. There are two kinds of impediments to such a free and fair election. The first and most obvious kind of obstacle relates to violations of "process": these include the ever-present threat of manipulation of the electoral rolls, intimidation of voters, especially in the rural areas, and the dangers of rigging, usually effectuated by "adding" the votes required to secure the desirable results before the tallying centers are permitted to announce the official results. While such "process" violations are commonplace in Pakistani elections and can be mitigated somewhat by the presence of election monitors, the major hazards this time around arise from violations of "structure," that is, from the deliberate maintenance of an irregular playing field designed to illegitimately advantage certain favored parties in the election. Examples of such structural violations include the Musharraf government's refusal to suspend the nazims (mayors) who orchestrate the local misdeeds required to produce the desired outcomes at the polls; the failure to fill the slots allocated to the North West Frontier Province and the Sindh on the Election Commission; the regime's refusal to allow exit polling as a means of mitigating, however partially, the threat of rigging; the continued restrictions on the media; the blatant use of official and state machinery in support of certain political favorites; and most problematic of all, the manifest partiality of the president and the provincial governors along with the caretaker and local governments. Not surprisingly, then, one watchdog group of eminent Pakistanis, the Citizens Group on Electoral Process (CGEP), has assessed the pre-poll electoral process in Pakistan to be highly unfair, giving it a score of only 26 on a scale of 100 in respect to the overall fairness of the polling environment in a period spanning 12 months.

Despite these efforts, however, it is not clear whether Musharraf's preferred partners will be able to win the election. If this is the case, and if Musharraf is unable to cobble together a coalition that would acquiesce to his continuation in office, the stage would be set for a serious constitutional crisis in Pakistan. Given the failure of the political "market" in Pakistan referred to earlier, it is possible—perhaps even likely—that any election result, even if fair, will be challenged vociferously by the losers. And the lack of reasonable prior information about the preferences of Pakistan's electorate makes it difficult to judge whether such complaints are in fact justified or whether they simply understandable but nonetheless illegitimate protests provoked by political defeat. In any event, if such dissatisfaction results in violence that leads to a breakdown in law and order requiring the Pakistan Army to be deployed for policing operations, this diversion to internal security duties would not only distract from the counterterrorism operations currently underway in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) but also would strain the comity currently existing between President Musharraf and the Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Kiyani. Depending on how such a crisis unfolds, a major meltdown in domestic order that results in significant fatalities as a result of military action could be one important driver (among others) that compels the leadership of the Pakistan Army to force Musharraf's exit as president. The potential for civil unrest and instability emerging from a flawed election in Pakistan, therefore, ought to remain the most problematic contingency from the viewpoint of the Bush administration.

Attempting to avert just this prospect and to further the cause of a genuinely free election in Pakistan, many critics of the administration have argued in Joshua Kurlantzick's words, that "the U[nited] S[tates] needs to abandon Musharraf today."[1] While that sentiment is understandable, the prescription is premature. It is also among the more risky responses that could be adopted by the United States right now. The Bush administration almost certainly will reject it—until it is confronted with no other choice. There is no need, moreover, to embark on such a drastic course of action at the present moment. After all, it is possible that the forthcoming election could produce a result—either through pre- or post-election negotiations between Musharraf and the political parties—that is compatible with his desire to remain in office. What is, therefore, important from the viewpoint of U.S. interests is that no premature decision with respect to supporting or abandoning Musharraf be made right away. Rather, U.S. policymakers and the Congress ought to focus on prevailing upon Musharraf to oversee a fair election that reflects certain standards of legitimacy by remedying the structural and process irregularities that currently threaten to vitiate the electoral process and thereby distort the desire of the Pakistani people to express themselves clearly. If this can be achieved, it would be a considerable accomplishment that would help to provide the important missing information about Pakistan's political preferences, clarify Musharraf's own future options and, by implication, delineate the reasonable alternatives facing the United States.

If this cannot be achieved at the end of the day, the administration will be confronted with difficult choices. Irrespective of how it is inclined to respond to such a contingency, three considerations ought to be borne in mind.

First, the Pakistani people today are tired of both President Musharraf and continued military rule and, given the political crisis that has been underway in Pakistan almost uninterruptedly since March 2007, are unlikely to give Musharraf the benefit of the doubt if the February election is marked by gross irregularities.

Second, the administration would be unwise to put itself in a position of diametric opposition to the will of the Pakistani people, whose inclinations will become more and more evident through both the character of the electoral process and—if fair—its result. In this context, the administration ought to avoid pretending to be neutral as structural violations of the electoral process by Musharraf continue merely because that might help to avoid an unfavorable electoral outcome that either increases domestic instability in Pakistan or compels the United States to make some hard choices. Such an approach, however appealing it may appear in the short term, will only exacerbate the problems in Pakistan, not eliminate them. The administration also ought to focus less on playing midwife in delivering certain political outcomes in the forthcoming election and more on assuring a responsive, credible, and legitimate electoral process.

Third, the ongoing political transition in Pakistan—including the growing national clamor for a return to democracy centered on an abiding rule of law—can no longer remain isolated from the larger war on terrorism. Although the legitimacy of Musharraf's rule and the character of Pakistan's apex governing arrangements were initially not central to either U.S. counterterrorism interests or Islamabad's counterterrorism performance, both these variables have now become important to Pakistan's ability to win the struggle against Islamist extremism. A continuing constriction of democracy could, if it leads to social disorder, distract the Pakistan Army even as it widens the opportunity for the more radical elements in Pakistani society to dominate their nation's political space to the long-term detriment of both Pakistan and the United states.

(II) Pursuing Counterterrorism Operations

Even if a reasonably fair election were to be completed and a legitimate civilian authority arrives in office, it would be too much to expect that Pakistan's counterterrorism operations would be dramatically transformed either in motivation or effectiveness. Appreciating this fact requires understanding the nature of the terrorist groups within Pakistan and the character of Islamabad's counterterrorism strategy vis-à-vis these groups.

As things stand today, it is possible to identify five distinct extremist groups that ought to be the legitimate target of Pakistani law enforcement and military operations:

(i) Sectarian groups, such as the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Shia Tehrik-e-Jafria, which are engaged in violence within Pakistan;

(ii) Anti-Indian terrorist groups that operate with Pakistani military and ISID support, such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), and the Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM);

(iii) The Pakistani "Taliban" groups, consisting of the extremist outfits in the FATA, led by individuals such as Baitullah Mahsud, the chieftain of the Mahsud tribe in South Waziristan, Maulana Faqir Muhammad and Maulana Qazi Fazlullah of the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad, and Mangal Bagh Afridi of the Lashkar-e-Islami in the Khyber Agency;

(iv) The original Taliban movement and especially its Kandahari leadership centered around Mullah Mohammad Omar and believed to be now resident in Quetta; and, finally,

(v) al-Qaeda and its affiliates, meaning the non-South Asian terrorists currently ensconced in the FATA region of the North West Frontier Province in Pakistan.

Since September 2001, President Musharraf has pursued a highly differentiated counterterrorism policy that has involved treating each of these targets differently. He systematically suppressed mainly those domestic terrorist groups like the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Shia Tehrik-e-Jafria that had engaged in bloody internal sectarian violence but, more importantly, had subverted critical state objectives. By contrast, he largely ignored the terrorist outfits operating against India in Kashmir and elsewhere: although he has controlled their infiltration into Kashmir in recent years, this restraint has not extended to either abandoning or eliminating them in the manner witnessed, for example, in the case of the more virulent anti-national sectarian entities operating within Pakistan. Fearful of Washington's disfavor, Musharraf has attacked al-Qaeda resolutely, if not always effectively. Although the Pakistani Taliban did not exist as realistic threats in 2001, Musharraf has also combated them vigorously and as best he can, though in all instances where active counterterrorism operations are underway, Pakistani military effectiveness remains hobbled by real limitations in capacity. Musharraf has approached the original Taliban in a manner more akin to the Kashmiri terrorists and has avoided targeting them comprehensively; he has especially overlooked their leadership now resident in and around Quetta.

A summary assessment of Musharraf's counterterrorism operations against extremist groups, therefore, must conclude that they are at the very least "segmented" and that this discordance can be accounted principally by how important the exempted groups are to Pakistan's national interests. Because the original Taliban and especially its Kandahari leadership is critical to the attainment of Islamabad's objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan, just as the Kashmiri terrorist groups are vis-à-vis India, the Pakistani state has refrained from attacking them in any significant or decisive way. Although this discriminative approach to fighting terrorism was shaped and implemented by General Musharraf in his dual capacity as president and previously chief of army staff, it would be erroneous to conclude, however, that this prevailing strategy is owed simply to the whim of one man. This is particularly relevant today when Musharraf's hold on power has become progressively weaker and the future of his political status and effectiveness increasingly clouded. Rather, Musharraf's decisions in regard to counterterrorism strategy since 2001, although publicly perceived as personal dicta, invariably reflected the consensus among the corps commanders of the Pakistan Army and, hence, represent the preferences of Pakistan's military-dominated state.

In other words, even if Musharraf were to suddenly exit the Pakistani political scene at some point, Islamabad's currently discordant counterterrorism strategy would still survive so long as the men on horseback continue to be the principal guardians of national security policymaking in Islamabad. Because it is unreasonable to expect that the uniformed military will give up its privileges in this regard anytime soon—even if a civilian regime were to return to the helm in the future—the internally segmented counterterrorism policy currently pursued by Pakistan will likely persist for some time to come.

Even if it could be imagined that a civilian dispensation could wrest some control of Pakistan's national security policy from the military, it is not at all certain that the current strategic direction would change dramatically. A civilian regime would probably have greater incentives to combat all sectarian terrorist groups more evenhandedly, but that too is uncertain. Whether they would do better in regards to anti-Indian terrorist groups is also unclear: after all, both the principal Pakistani civilian political parties historically permitted their military and intelligence services to aid, abet, and arm the terrorist groups operating in Kashmir and elsewhere in India, sometimes because they were simply powerless to prevent it but at other times with their full knowledge and consent. Both the principal civilian political alternatives in Pakistan would likely continue to prosecute the current antiterrorism operations against both al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban because there is a consensus among the country's centrist political elites that these groups remain grave threats to both their country and the writ of their state. It is not obvious, however, that they either could or would extend this campaign to include the original Taliban and especially their fugitive leadership.

This fact, however, only underscores the continuity that is likely to persist in Pakistan's approach to counterterrorism even if a civilian government were to ascend to power in Islamabad. Although there are likely to be differences in style, nuance, and emphasis, the weaknesses of Pakistan's moderate political parties, Islamabad's enduring interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India, and the likely inability of any civilian government to exercise comprehensive control over the Pakistani military and intelligence services all combine to suggest that dramatic changes in attitude and performance toward the Taliban and the terrorist groups operating on Indian soil may not be forthcoming. And, although sectarian groups within Pakistan as well as liberal ideals in Pakistani politics may be pursued more urgently and hopefully just as resolutely as the war against al-Qaeda, the net deviation from Musharraf's currently segmented antiterrorism policies may be either too subtle or too insignificant to really matter.

(III) Reorienting U.S. Assistance to Pakistan

The issue of reorienting U.S. assistance to Pakistan as a means of shaping Pakistan's political evolution is a tricky one and fraught with uncertainty and risk.

As Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet have pointed out, the majority of the $10 billion transferred to Islamabad since 2001 has gone towards military assistance: fully 57 percent, or $5.64 billion, has gone toward Coalition Support Funds (CSF); roughly 18 percent, or $1.8 billion, has been obligated towards security assistance; about 16 percent, or $1.62 billion, has been absorbed by economic and budget support in the form of direct cash transfers; and only the residual amount, some 9 percent, or $.9 billion, has been allocated towards development and humanitarian assistance.[2] This assistance pattern suggests quite emphatically, as Cohen and Chollet have phrased it, that American aid to Pakistan since the September 11, 2001, attacks "is not money intended to transform the nature of the Pakistani state or society or to strengthen Pakistan's internal stability. In effect, it is politically determined assistance, a "thank you" to Musharraf's regime for the critical role Pakistan has played in Operation Enduring Freedom."[3] That such a conclusion should be drawn is not surprising because the Bush administration unfortunately has ended up emphasizing counterterrorism objectives in Pakistan to the neglect of promoting democracy, renewing Pakistani society, and refurbishing its economic foundations so as to permit stability and development.

What should Congress do at this juncture then? First, since counterterrorism operations will continue to be important to American security for the foreseeable future, cutting back on CSF will be difficult, if not impossible. Because these funds have been very shoddily dispersed since 2001, however, reforming the disbursal system—by amending the authorizing legislation if necessary—is critical. The current system of simply cutting checks for whatever bills are presented monthly by Islamabad as the costs borne for counterterrorism support engenders institutional corruption in the Pakistani military, destroys the integrity of the U.S. assistance program, and is unfair to the U.S. taxpayer. Because money is ultimately fungible, and because it is very likely that Islamabad charges Washington for far more than it actually spends on counterterrorism operations, the current CSF allocation ends up becoming a straightforward subsidy for Pakistani purchases of expensive weapon systems whose principal value derives primarily from their utility against India. An alternative modality of disbursing coalition support funds to Pakistan, where reimbursements are tied either to specific tasks and linked to the performance of specific objectives or allocated for specific purposes, is long overdue. Such reform would, not only better align U.S. financial burdens with the true services rendered by Pakistan but also ensure that U.S. military assistance would actually be used for counterterrorism efforts rather than diverted toward other programs, while simultaneously serving as a subtle reminder to Islamabad that U.S. generosity cannot be taken for granted in the face of continuing prevarication.

Second, many of the components of the recently obligated $750 million U.S. assistance program to the FATA are eminently sensible and, if properly implemented, could help considerably in advancing the common U.S. and Pakistani goal of local stability. This includes the effort to improve Frontier Corps training; expand access to education, health, and community services; increase the investments in infrastructure; and strengthen local public diplomacy, counter-narcotics, and border control management. Several elements, however, remain of concern. To begin with, Pakistan's financial contribution to the FATA improvement program is asymmetrically minuscule in comparison to that of the United States, raising questions about Islamabad's stakes in, and ownership of, such an ambitious effort. Further, the complicated and time-consuming nature of this project, the uncertainty about its effective implementation, and the acute physical risks to what will inevitably be "high demand, low density" investments spark concerns about the ultimate success of the program. Finally, Washington's failure to condition the availability of these new funds on Islamabad's implementation of political reforms in the tribal regions embodies a great lost opportunity: Requiring Islamabad to begin the process of revising the Frontier Crimes Regulation, eliminating the political agent as part of the larger process of integrating the FATA into Pakistan's North West Frontier Province under the full jurisdiction of the provincial and national legislatures and the judicial system, and withdrawing the restrictions on political parties operating in the FATA with an eye to introducing conventional political institutions, would have provided the critical complementarities required to ensure that the current U.S. investments in the FATA would finally pay off in terms of local stability.

Third, Congress ought to revisit the larger composition of U.S. assistance to Pakistan, specifically the mix between military and developmental assistance which hitherto has been lopsidedly tilted towards the former. Given that Pakistan has also now passed its most serious moment of economic crisis, the United States should cut back on economic support funds, cash transfers, and other forms of budgetary support because these subsidies function as the equivalent of the "resource curse"—unearned "rents" that prevent Islamabad from having to pursue sound economic policies, exculpate it from responsibility for its decisions, and inexcusably liberate it from the constraints of opportunity costs, not to mention helping to destroy whatever notions of democratic responsiveness may still survive within the polity. While the level and desirability of economic support funds to Pakistan should, therefore, be reviewed by Congress sooner rather than later, Congress also ought to refrain from blocking the transfer of high-end weapons that Pakistan has already purchased. While there is a compelling case to be made that the administration ought to be more restrained in its willingness to transfer certain high-leverage weapons such as advanced air-to-air missiles and airborne warning and control systems to Islamabad for reasons related to both regional stability and technological security, Congress should not today interrupt the transfer of certain high-profile systems, such as F-16 aircraft, already committed to Pakistan.

The reasons for eschewing such action are many: first, to avoid further abrading Pakistani sentiments in regard to an aircraft that enjoys a convoluted symbolism in the recent history of U.S.-Pakistan relations; second, to avert in crisis in relations with the Pakistani military and especially with the new Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Kiyani, who is by all accounts a professional soldier sympathetic to advancing U.S. counterterrorism objectives; third, to refrain from reinforcing the impression in Pakistan of the United States as an inconstant and self-serving ally; and, lastly and perhaps most importantly, to move the bilateral relationship away from a "transactional approach" centered on "specific reciprocity," where Islamabad performs certain desirable actions as a response to some tit-for-tat stimulus, to something that resembles a "relational equilibrium" based on "diffuse reciprocity," where Islamabad pursues the right policies because the expectation of a steady and lasting partnership with Washington propels it to act with rectitude, confident that its good conduct would lead to a wider institutionalization of trust that would pay for itself over time.

(IV) The Security of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal

Although the security of Islamabad's nuclear arsenal remains uppermost in the public mind during any crisis in Pakistan, it is my judgment that Pakistan's strategic assets—to include its nuclear devices, its delivery systems, and its stockpile of fissile materials—are fundamentally safe today. Compared to the situation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was still relatively vulnerable to a variety of external and internal threats, the security of these assets has improved dramatically as a result of the protective measures put in place since the late 1990s. The Director General of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Lieutenant General (retd.) Khalid Kidwai deserves singular credit for remedying the security vulnerabilities that traditionally plagued the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. These remedies, focused on insulating the strategic reserves against both external and internal dangers, involve a combination of solutions ranging from tightened physical security at strategic installations, to large investments in opacity and deception and denial, to incorporation of technical controls on the nuclear weapons themselves, to the institutionalization of organizational solutions aimed at preventing insider threats. As a result of these cumulative improvements, I believe that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal today is impervious to virtually all threats that might be imagined as materializing in peacetime.

The following exceptions apply to this general conclusion. The most potent threat to the security of Pakistan's nuclear estate currently arises primarily from contingencies involving a fissure in the Pakistani military and a breakdown in the system of authority and command. I do not believe this to be a realistic threat in present circumstances and even if relations between President Musharraf and the Chief of Army Staff, General Kiyani, were to become estranged to the point of rupture, the threat of a breakdown in the command system of the Pakistani military would be minimal, given that Musharraf no longer enjoys any line-level control over his nation's armed forces. Even if some Islamist parties were to come to power through the ballot in Pakistan, they would enjoy no operational control over Pakistan's nuclear assets. Unless one posits, therefore, a truly extreme scenario where the chief of army staff himself turns out to be secretly a political extremist, the security of Islamabad's nuclear capabilities ought not to become a matter of more than prudential concern. The real threats to the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal are likely to arise mostly over the longer term: if the rising tide of Islamization in Pakistani society seeps into its armed forces or into its scientific establishments—as many fear it already has, especially in the lower ranks—and the SPD's internal security mechanisms fail to detect the threat either because they are themselves compromised or because of oversight errors and deficiencies, the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and materials may once again be at risk. Obviously, this is a contingency that the current military leadership in Pakistan is especially sensitive to, but it remains a good reason for the United States to stay engaged with the Pakistani military to help mitigate this threat should it arise.

To end this discussion, the relative high level of security that currently characterizes the Pakistani nuclear arsenal implies that the administration ought to make its decisions about supporting Musharraf without reference to any fictitious fears about the dangers his exit may pose to the protection of the arsenal. Whatever the reasons for buttressing or abandoning Musharraf may be, the impressive improvement in the security of Pakistan's nuclear assets during the last decade or so implies that concerns about a compromise of these capabilities should be among the factors least relevant to that decision.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention and your consideration.

[1] Joshua Kurlantzick, "Time's Up: The U.S. Needs to Abandon Musharraf Today," The New Republic, November 5, 2007.

[2] Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, "When $10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking U.S. Strategy toward Pakistan," The Washington Quarterly, 30:2 (Spring 2007), 7–19.

[3] Ibid., 11.

USAID Awarded Grant for Pakistan Election Observation

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 13:09:20 +0000

WASHINGTON, D.C. - The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) earlier this month awarded Democracy International a grant to organize an international election observation mission for the February 18, 2008 parliamentary elections in Pakistan. Led by former U.S. Congressman Jim Moody, the 35-person delegation will include leaders from the political, academic and foreign policy fields, as well as experts in election processes and Pakistani politics.

This mission will complement other international observers from Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan and the European Union.

The grant is part of the $1.5 billion in aid that the U.S. Government is providing to Pakistan, through USAID, over five years to improve economic growth, education, health, governance, and reconstruction of earthquake-affected areas.

Democracy International, based in Bethesda, MD., designs, evaluates, implements, and provides technical assistance for democracy and governance programs.

For more information about USAID and its programs in Pakistan, visit www.usaid.gov.

Source: USAID Press Release

Coalition Troops in Iraq Kill Two Insurgents, Capture 24

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 12:56:18 +0000

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, DC – Coalition forces killed two terrorists and captured 24 suspects today during operations to disrupt al Qaeda networks operating in central and northern Iraq, military officials said Sunday.

In Sharqat, coalition forces targeted the alleged founder of an insurgent group tied to the leader of the al Qaeda in Iraq network in Beiji. As coalition forces called for the occupants of a target building to come out, one man ran out of the building and was directed to stop. He continued toward the ground force's position despite continued commands to stop and was killed. Two suspected terrorists were detained during the operation.

South of Kirkuk today, coalition forces captured an alleged associate of the terrorist network in the city. The suspect is linked to the alleged former leader of the assassination cell in Hawijah who was detained Jan. 10. Coalition forces detained four other suspected terrorists.

During two operations in Mosul today, coalition forces detained five suspected terrorists while targeting associates of foreign terrorists and weapons facilitators.

"These captures represent another step forward in disrupting the al Qaeda networks operating in northern Iraq," said Navy Cmdr. Scott Rye, a Multinational Force Iraq spokesman. "As terrorists move their operations, we will follow. Al Qaeda will find no safe haven in Iraq."

Coalition forces killed an armed suspect during an assault on a suspected finance network for Iranian-trained "special groups" today in the Suwayrah area, south of Baghdad, military officials said. Upon arrival to the target area, coalition forces were engaged by an armed suspect. Coalition forces returned fire, killing the suspect. Large amounts of Iraqi currency were found on site.

Also in Baghdad today, coalition forces captured an alleged senior level car-bomb facilitator for al Qaeda in Iraq networks throughout Baghdad and north to Tikrit. Reports indicate the detainee was a former leader for the network in Karkh and was involved in the abduction of an Iraqi intelligence officer last spring. The suspect is believed to be a direct associate of senior al Qaeda leaders throughout Baghdad and the surrounding area. Coalition forces detained another suspect without incident.

In another operation conducted in western Baghdad today, coalition forces detained three suspected terrorists, including a person linked to the transport of improvised explosive device and car bomb supplies in northern Iraq.

Also today, seven more suspects were detained during coalition operations in Baqouba and southwest of Samarra.

"Iraqi and coalition forces are on the offensive against al Qaeda in Iraq," said Army Maj. Winfield Danielson, a Multinational Force Iraq spokesman. "We're finding the places they hide and disrupting the supply of weapons they use for vicious attacks against innocent Iraqis."

Also today, the alert action of Iraqi soldiers prevented a suicide bomber from reaching her intended target in Baghdad's Rusafa sector. As a result of their quick reaction, officials said, the only death resulting from the aborted attack was that of the female suicide bomber.

Two Iraqi citizens were injured in the blast. The attempted attack took place when a woman, who appeared to be a beggar, was noticed having a bulky protrusion around her midsection, said Iraqi Army Col. Fahdel, 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division. Alert Iraqi soldiers quickly realized her intent and ordered her to raise her hands, said Fahdel. At that time, she raised one of her hands, but had an object with wires attached concealed in her other hand.

Sensing the potential danger, the soldiers fired three rounds. The woman staggered back to a nearby shop, where the blast detonated. It is unknown whether she detonated the blast herself or if it was detonated by another source. The soldiers' quick action prevented the potential loss of a large number of civilian lives.

In Saturday's Iraq operations:

-- In Mosul, coalition forces captured an alleged al Qaeda leader involved in the network on the east side of the city. Reports indicate the suspect is associated with several senior leaders in the area, including a judge of a terrorist illegal court system, and the radical Taliban-like spiritual advisor for the al Qaeda in Iraq networks in the city. The ground force detained one suspect in addition to the wanted individual.

-- In another Mosul operation, coalition forces detained nine more suspected terrorists. In one of the target buildings, the ground force discovered what they assessed to be an IED materials cache. Once the area was clear and secure, coalition forces destroyed the explosive materials to prevent future use for terrorist attacks.

-- U.S. troops killed two terrorists during raids to disrupt al Qaeda operations northeast of Samarra near the Hamrin Mountains.

-- Members of the Sons of Iraq citizens' security group delivered two suspected terrorists to U.S. soldiers posted in Baghdad's East Rashid sector. The citizens had seized the suspects because they were carrying homemade explosives, which were later safely destroyed. Meanwhile, U.S. soldiers on patrol found a penetrator-type mine and 10 60 mm mortar rounds. Three men were detained during the incident.

In Feb. 15 Iraq operations:

-- Two terrorists detonated suicide vests, killing three Iraqi civilians and one Iraqi policeman outside a mosque in Tal Afar. Sixteen Iraqis were injured during the prayer-time explosion. "Our condolences go out to the families of those who lost loved ones in this senseless act," said Army Maj. Gary Dangerfield, a U.S. military spokesman. Information from the city's mayor indicates the damage and loss of life would have been much greater if the terrorists had been able to detonate their vests inside the mosque.

-- Iraqi National Police and U.S. troops discovered two weapons caches during a joint mission north of Baghdad. The total amount of ordnance discovered included 112 rocket-propelled grenade launchers; three white-phosphorus mortars; 16 82 mm mortars; six blasting caps; an improvised blasting cap; 13 hand grenades; 10 120 mm mortar propellant bags; 1,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition; an 81 mm mortar and a rocket. The rocket was destroyed on site.

-- Soldiers with the 82nd Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team captured a key special groups criminal leader in Baghdad's Shaab neighborhood. U.S. intelligence sources said the detainee is linked to a series of area kidnappings and murders. The suspect also is believed responsible for weapons smuggling operations and the November bombing of a coalition outpost as well as the killing of an Iraqi police official.

-- Tipped off by an Iraqi citizen, U.S. soldiers found a substantial weapons and ammunitions cache in northwest Baghdad. The cache contained 80 81 mm mortar rounds, 38 120 mm mortar rounds, 33 107 mm rockets, a 60 mm mortar round, 500 anti-aircraft rounds, 50 rocket sleds and components, 30 hand grenades, 10 rocket-propelled grenade rounds, five RPG launchers, five mortar tubes, seven new AK-47s, five MP5 submachine guns and 150 200-round belts of 7.62 mm ammunition. "These were weapons ready to be used against the Iraqi people," said Army Lt. Col. Steve Stover, a U.S. military spokesman. "Countless lives were saved because one concerned Iraqi citizen tipped
off coalition forces about this cache."

-- Attack helicopters responded to a small-arms fire attack on coalition forces near the town of Jurf al-Sukr. The helicopters engaged one structure with rockets. The incident is under investigation.

-- Members of the Sons of Iraq citizens' group handed over a suspected special groups criminal to U.S. soldiers posted in Baghdad's West Rashid sector. The suspect was taken to a coalition forces' detention facility for questioning.

In Feb. 13 Iraq operations:

-- Iraqi and U.S. Special Forces troops detained seven suspected al Qaeda terrorists during a Baghdad-area operation. The detainees are linked to multiple improvised-explosive device attacks against Iraqi and coalition forces. A former insurgent provided information about terrorist groups operating in the area.

-- Iraqi forces discovered a large weapons cache and delivered it to coalition troops. The munitions were collected by Iraqi civil defense employees from the towns of Numaniyah, Suveira and Aziziyah. The cache contained more than 2,000 pieces of munitions, including a 107 mm rocket, 14.5 mm rounds, 82 mm rounds, 155 mm rounds, 100 mm rounds, hand grenades, 130 mm rounds and 30 meters of fuse-fire cord.

Source: US Department of Denfense - (Compiled from Multinational Force Iraq and Multinational Corps Iraq news releases.)

U.S. Forces Help Equip Iraqi Troops

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 18 Feb 2008 12:42:32 +0000

By Seaman William Selby, USN
Special to American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. forces are helping make sure the Iraqi Army will have enough equipment and weapons to defend itself, a senior military official said last week.

"We are introducing more military sales to the (Iraqi) minister of defense, and we are making progress," said Army Col. Stephen K. Scott, director of Army Programs – Foreign Military Sales for Multi-National Security Transition - Iraq, during a conference call from Iraq with online journalist and "bloggers."

Scott explained that the equipment and weapons that the Iraqis use is very old and inferior to what the U.S. military uses.

"We have 50,000 M-16s on order and they already have 43,000 on hand," said Scott. He added, "Our goal is to have 165,000 M-16s, one for every Iraqi soldier."

Scott said the M-16 rifle is far better than the AK-47 currently used by the Iraqi Army because it's newer and has more features. Rifles, however, are not the only items the Iraqis want replace.

"We have given them armored trucks, support equipment, uniforms and we are in the process of training their Air Force to fly certain aircraft," said Scott.

Scott attributed the Iraqis cooperation with the changes to a "great relationship with the Ministry of Defense and the new officers in their army."

"It is very important to their government and ours that they become capable of defending themselves very soon," Scott said.

The main concern for this program it seems is if we can trust the Iraqi security forces not to sell these products to insurgents.

"I am very confident these weapons will not be lost or overturned to anyone else, they are too proud of them," Scott said.

"The Minister of Defense himself has taken a keen interest in the accountability of the weapons," he added.

Scott has been deployed in Baghdad now for two months and said the Iraqis now refer to U.S. soldiers and officials as their brothers.

"I am excited about what the future brings in Iraq and their capability to stand themselves up," Scott said.

Source: US Department of Defense - (Seaman William Selby works for the New Media branch of American Forces Information Service.)

US Seeks Death Penalty for Six 9-11 Suspects at Guantanamo

kpaul.mallasch — Tue, 12 Feb 2008 09:58:12 +0000

By Cindy Saine
Voice of America

WASHINGTON DC - Speaking to reporters at the Pentagon today, Air Force Brigadier General Thomas Hartmann announced the first sweeping charges brought against suspected conspirators in the September 11th attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania.

General Hartmann, the legal adviser to the U.S. military tribunal system identified the six men facing charges.

The accused are Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Waleed bin Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi and Mohammed al Kahtani.

Each of the defendants is charged with conspiracy, murder in violation of the law of war, attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects and terrorism, among other charges.

The military is recommending that the six men be tried together before a military tribunal at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and is seeking the death penalty for all six defendants. Hartmann says the charges lay out a long-term, sophisticated plan by al-Qaida to attack the United States, coordinated by Khalid Sheik Mohammed.

"The charges allege that Khalid Sheik Mohammed was the mastermind of the 9-11 attacks by proposing the operational concept to Osama bin Laden as early as 1996, obtaining approval and funding from Osama bin Laden for the attacks, overseeing the entire operation and training the hijackers in all aspects of the operation in Afghanistan and Pakistan," he said.

The charges are now being translated into all the defendants' native languages and served. The charges will then go to convening authority Judge Susan Crawford who will have sole discretion on whether to proceed with them and whether or not to seek the death penalty.

If the cases go to to trial, it will bring increased scrutiny to the military commission system, which has been criticized by civil rights groups for not providing the same legal protection as American civilian courts. Another issue is whether prosecutors will be able to use confessions or other information obtained during controversial interrogation techniques. Last week, CIA Director Michael Hayden confirmed publicly for the first time that Khalid Sheik Mohammed and two other terror suspects were subjected to a procedure called "waterboarding", which simulates drowning.

Today, General Hartmann said the court will decide what evidence will be admissible.

"Let me be clear," he said. "We are a nation of law and not of men, and the question of what evidence, will be admitted, whether waterboarding or otherwise will be decided in the courts, in front of a judge, after it is fought out between the defense and the prosecution in these cases."

Hartmann stressed that the accused will receive a fair trial and said they will have virtually the same rights as U.S. military personnel, including the right to be represented in court, the right to examine all evidence used against them, and the right to call witnesses on their own behalf.

The United States is still holding some 275 men at the controversial Guantanamo detention center.

Source: Voice of America

Sunrise Missions Lead to Improvements in Al Bawi, Iraq

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 11 Feb 2008 11:24:07 +0000

By Sgt. Natalie Rostek

COMBAT OUTPOST CAHILL, IRAQ - Soldiers and leaders of Company A, 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, visited Sons of Iraq members at checkpoints, Feb. 6, in al Bawi village.

According to Capt. William Clark, from Prairie Du Chien, Wis., commander of Company A, Soldiers had executed similar missions in the past and come under attack by small arms and improvised explosive devices. The past three visits to SoI checkpoints in al Bawi were peaceful, he said.

Company A arrived in the al Bawi area, northwest of Salman Pak, April, 2007. During the first six weeks at COP Cahill Clark said unit Soldiers were patrolling the streets seven days a week.

The Soldiers encountered their first IED strike during May 2007 and since then, IED strikes and indirect and small arms fire attacks were common.

Clark noticed a significant change in the security of the area starting in early November. He attributes this turnaround to 563 members of the SoI patrolling the area and manning checkpoints in al Bawi.

He said his main point of contact, Sheik Ali, leader of the SoI in the area, lives in al Bawi.

"He went from informing us of AQI leaders and IED emplacers to becoming the public figure for Salman Pak and the Mada'in Qada," Clark said. "His personal land encompasses a decent part of Al Bawi so most of the Sons of Iraq are his relatives and people from his tribe."

According to Company A, 1st Sgt. Troy Moore, from Poughkeepsie, N.Y., the SoI had a choice; they could either side with AQI or they could help coalition forces accomplish their mission of improving security.

"Al-Qaida was using fear and intimidation to get their way," Moore said. "These people are sick of that and are standing up for themselves. The Sons of Iraq program is a way for them to make money to support their families."

Clark explained the SoI program caught on in Salman Pak after succeeding in other areas around the Mada'in Qada.

"I believe the program started in (Tuwaitha) and has had a lot of success," Clark said. "This gave people faith and hope in that it wasn't just a limited program in one area but that it was all through Iraq."

Clark, Moore, and other Company A Soldiers and leaders visited checkpoints along the route in al Bawi to inspect and assess the progress of the SoI manning the checkpoints.

"From what we saw, the checkpoints were fully manned and they had done a great job with the sandbags," Clark said.

Clark meets with the SoI in al Bawi often, he said. The group has found over 40 IEDs and approximately 10 to 15 caches since last November.

Moore said meetings like this make it safer for coalition forces to be on the streets. He also believes the personal relationships with the SoI builds confidence in group members.

"We have to show that we trust them," Troy said. "If we don't, they will ask ‘well why are we even doing this if you don't trust us?'."

Clark is proud of his Soldiers and the progress they have made in al Bawi.

"In the last three months we have seen a significant improvement in Salman Pak," Clark said. "It has been 14 days since the last fire fight. Since the sunrise missions, things have been relatively quiet. The JSS was receiving small arms fire attacks every day since we got here and there has not been one since Zelig Sunrise (early February). We have found one IED since December. We were finding them every other day."

Company A, 1-15 Inf. Regt. is assigned to the 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, from Fort Benning, Ga., and has been deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom since March 2007.

Source: DVIDS News Press Release (US Military)

Robert M. Gates Favors Pause After Surge Redeployments

kpaul.mallasch — Mon, 11 Feb 2008 10:55:32 +0000

By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

FORWARD OPERATING BASE FALCON, IRAQ – Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said today he'll probably recommend a pause for evaluation and assessment in Iraq before further troop reductions when the last surge brigade leaves in July.

Gates spoke following a two-hour meeting with Multinational Force Iraq commander Army Gen. David H. Petraeus.

"I think the notion of a brief period of consolidation and evaluation probably does make sense," Gates told reporters traveling with him. The secretary did not speculate on how long the pause would be.

Last month, Petraeus recommended a pause in redeployment from Iraq after the surge brigades left Iraq. The first of the five surge brigades left Iraq in December. The second is scheduled to leave by the end of next month, then one more will go home each month through July. This will leave 15 brigade combat teams – or their equivalents – in Iraq.

Petraeus said he wanted to have a pause to reassess the conditions on the ground and to evaluate how the Iraqis are picking up the security mission.

Gates has said repeatedly that conditions on the ground will dictate how fast further brigades will redeploy. Though he had expressed the hope that more brigades could leave Iraq in August, he said he had been leaning toward a brief pause.

"I had been kind of headed in that direction as well," he said. "One of the keys is how long is that period and then what happens after that. All of that is still to be determined, and then ultimately decided by the president."

Gates arrived in Baghdad last night and immediately went to a working dinner with Iraqi officials, including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Gates complimented the Iraqis on the legislative progress they have made and urged them to keep it up.

This morning, the secretary had breakfast with Multinational Corps Iraq sergeants major. He said the sergeants major talked to him about troop morale, the commitment the troops have made and problems that remain.

Following the breakfast, he moved to the Al Faw Palace and presented Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno and Command Sgt. Maj. Neil L. Ciotola with awards for their service in Iraq. Odierno and Ciotola are the commander and senior enlisted advisor for the Multinational Corps Iraq, and they're wrapping up their 15-month tour this week. Pending Senate confirmation, Odierno is slated to receive his fourth star and to become Army vice chief of staff later this year.

"General Odierno and his team arrived last year in what was considered a grim time in the Iraq mission," Gates said. "Under the guidance of General Petraeus, the corps carried out a strategy that combined classic counterinsurgency principles with approaches that broke new ground in the history of warfighting."

Gates said the corps made impressive gains under Odierno and Ciocola, saying attacks have dropped and the Iraqis have a chance for freedom and prosperity.

Source: US Department of Defense Press Release